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COMES NOW Timothy Williams ("Williams" or "Petitioner"), by and through his
counsel of record, the law firm of Jones • Gledhill • Fuhrman • Gourley, P.A., and hereby
submits his Brief in reply to the Respondent's Brief filed on or about January 2,2014.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Respondent, the Board of Real Estate Appraisers has at least four insurmountable
issues with its prosecution of this matter and its February 27, 2009 Final Order that require this
Court to reverse the Board's Final Order, namely:
1. The Board committed irreversible procedural error (i.e., there exists no sworn
complaint and no motions were made to perform the subject investigations);
2. A substantive error in the law has occurred (i.e., there is no legal basis supporting a
violation of Idaho Code § 54-4107(1)(d) and (e), and there is no factual finding of a
substantial misrepresentation having occurred pursuant to Idaho Code § 54-4107(1)
(c), in relation to Counts Two and Eight);
3. The Petitioner was deprived of a substantial right and due process requires reversal of
the Board's Final Order; and,
4. The Board Chairman is biased and punitive in this matter, and his recusal at the
midnight hour comes too late and is without effect.

II.

PROCEDURAL ERROR

Idaho Code § 54-4107(1) (2005 version) specifically and unequivocally states that "upon
a written sworn complaint" or "upon its own motion" the Board may investigate actions of any
state licensed or certified real estate appraiser. Notwithstanding, the un-refuted testimony of the
Board's investigator, Cindy Rowland, nlk/a Cindy Stevenson, is that no written sworn complaint
was even received, and no motion by, or on behalf of, the Board was ever made, to investigate
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the actions of Petitioner, Timothy Williams. (See, R. Agency Exhs., at Exhibit No. 100 and No.
800, and R. Agency Tr., at p. 123, I. 16-19.) The Board concedes that it did not comply with the

clear and unambiguous directive of Idaho Code 54-4107(1). Instead, the Board spends pages and
pages in its Respondent's Brief trying to justify this procedural problem by asserting it lawfully
entered into a contract with "IBOL" to perform investigations for the Board. (Resp't Br., p. 310.) This entire discussion by the Board is irrelevant. See Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'l Med.

Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 265 P.3d 502 (2011) ("The interpretation of a statute must begin with the
literal words of the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning;
and the statute must be construed as a whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not
construe it, but simply follows the law as written." Id. at 893, 265 P.3d at 506 (internal citation
omitted)); See also AmeriTel Inns, Inc. v. Pocatello-Chubbuck Auditorium Dist., 146 Idaho 202,
192 P.3d 1026 (2008) (the Court must give effect to all the words and provisions of the statute so
that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant. Id. at 204, 192 P.3d at 1028)).
Likewise, the Board's reliance upon its internal procedures and policies to justify actions
III

excess of clear and unambiguous statutory authority is unavailing.

First, Respondent's

statement that "Pursuant to Exhibit "A," of the Agreement!, IBOL was clearly within its
authority to initiate the Janoush investigation after receiving a written and sworn complaint" is
unsupportable. Although the Board is correct that it would have been within its statutory
authority to initiate the investigation "after receiving a written and sworn complaint" the record
is undisputed that IBOL did not receive a sworn complaint. Thus, Respondent's reliance upon
this statement to supports its course of action is without support in the evidentiary record.

I

R. Agency, Vol. I, Tab No. 25, Exhibit "A," Agreement for Services Between the Idaho State Real Estate

Appraiser Board and the Bureau of Occupational Licenses, Exhibit "A," mOL Complaint Policy And
Procedure, pg. 17.
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The Board then attempts to deal with its procedural irregularities by stating that its
internal policy was to ignore the clear and unambiguous language in the statute and interpret it to
only require a "written and signed complaint." This assertion is unsupported both in fact, and in
law.

In particular, apart from citation to the contract between mOL and the Board, the Board's

repeated reliance upon its internal procedures is unsupported by any evidence presently before
this Court. For instance, assertions such as "it is clear that the Board interpreted its law to
allow," and "[t]he Board has never interpreted its law to require 'sworn complaints' " are
unsupported by any citation to the record before this Court. (Resp't Br., p. 9,10.) Consequently,
any reliance upon the Board's interpretation of its law and its procedures is erroneous. See Idaho
Code § 67-5277 (Judicial review is confined to the agency record.)

Notwithstanding, and in

addition, regardless of its standard practice, the Board does not have authority to adopt
regulations or procedures that are inconsistent with the clear and unambiguous statutory
authority granted to the Board pursuant to Idaho Code § 54-4107(1). See, Holly Care Center v.

State, Department of Employment, 110 Idaho 76, 78, 714 P.2d 45,47 (1986). The Board cannot
legislate, and cannot ignore or refuse to comply with clear directives and language in a statute
enacted by the Idaho legislature.
Finally, the repeated reliance upon the Board's authority to investigate, absent a sworn
complaint, pursuant to the more general provision of Idaho Code § 54-4106(2)(c) is likewise
unavailing. In particular, as noted above, Idaho Code § 54-4107(1) (2005 version) specifically
and unequivocally states that "upon a written sworn complaint" or "upon its own motion" the
Board may investigate actions of any state licensed or certified real estate appraiser. Here, the
unrefuted testimony establishes that no motion by or on behalf of the Board was ever made, to
investigate the actions of Petitioner, Timothy Williams. (See, R. Agency Exhs., at Exhibit No.
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100 and No. 800, and R. Agency Tr., at p. 123, t. 16-19.) Consequently, it makes no difference
whether the investigation was performed by an employee of the Board, an independent
contractor of the Board, or "IBOL." The issue is not who performed the investigation or whether
the Board's contract with "IBOL" is proper and enforceable, but rather the issue is whether there
exists a "written sworn complaint" or a "motion to investigate" by the Board.
Here, it is undisputed that the Board did not procedurally comply with Idaho Code § 544lO7. Notwithstanding its attempt at justification, the Board acted in excess of its statutory
authority and cannot cure this procedural defect by citing to unsupportable internal practices.
I.C. § 67-5279(3)(a) through (e). Moreover, the Board's actions directly violated substantial
rights of the appellant. Consequently, the Board's Final Order must be vacated as a matter of
law.

III.
A.

SUBSTANTIVE LAW ERROR

Statutory Law.
Idaho Code § 54-4107 (2005 version) sets forth when and under what circumstances the

Board may suspend or revoke any license or certificate issued and states, in part:
54-4107. Disciplinary proceedings. (1) The board shall upon a
written sworn complaint or may upon its own motion investigate the
actions of any state licensed or certified real estate appraiser and may
suspend or revoke any license or certificate issued under this chapter for
any of the following:
(c) Making any substantial misrepresentation, false promises or false
or fraudulent representations;
(d) Violating the provisions of this chapter or any rules ofthe Board;
(e) Being negligent or incompetent, as defined in the uniform
standards of professional appraisal practices, in developing an appraisal, in
preparing an appraisal report or in communicating an appraisal;
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B.

Claims of the Board.
The Board's Amended Complaint sets forth the following claims (reference to Claims

Three, Four, Five, Six, Seven and Nine have been omitted because no violation was found):
1) Count One - Williams allegedly accessed the Wells Fargo RETECHS computerized
bidding system using a competitor appraisers' name and password, and, thus, violated
Idaho Code §54-4107(l)(c).
2) Count Two - Williams allegedly represented he had personally inspected twelve (12)
properties that were the subject of an appraisal report, but had not actually inspected
the properties, and, thus, violated Idaho Code §54-4107(1)(c).
3) Count Eight - Donnelly appraisal - Williams signed an appraisal report regarding
property located at West Roseberry Road in Donnelly, Idaho that was allegedly
misleading, and, thus, violated Idaho Code §54-41 07(1)(d) and (e).

(5;ee, R. Agency, Vol. I, at Tab No. 53.) Thus, pursuant to the Board's Amended Complaint,
§54-4107(1)(d) and (e) are only applicable to Court Eight relating to the Donnelly appraisal, and
§54-41 07(1)(c) is only applicable Counts One and Two.
C.

Idaho Code § 54-4107(l)(d).
As stated above, subsection (l)(d) relates to "violating the provisions of this chapter or

any rules of Board." Neither the Hearing Officer, Mr. David Wynkoop, nor the Board have cited
any statutory provision within Idaho Code § 54-4101 et seq. (i.e., the Idaho Real Estate
Appraisers Act) or a rule of the Board that was allegedly violated by the Petitioner, Timothy
Williams.

Perhaps the Board is asserting a violation of (1)(c) and/or (e) as the basis for a

violation of (l)(d), but such a position renders the subsection meaningless. Thus, the Board's
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Final Order decreeing a violation of Idaho Code §54-4107(1)(d) must be reversed because there
is no factual or legal basis to support this finding. 2
D.

Idaho Code § 54-4107(1)(e).

Again, as stated above, Idaho Code § 54-4107(1)(e) sets forth that the Board may
suspend or revoke a license when a licensee is negligent or incompetent as defined by US PAP,
and states:
(e) Being negligent or incompetent, as defined in the uniform standards of
professional appraisal practices, in developing an appraisal, in preparing
an appraisal report or in communicating an appraisal.
I.C. §54-4107(1)(e) (emphasis added). The unrefuted testimony of Ted Whitmer, and per a
review of USP AP, establishes that USP AP does not define the terms "negligent" or
"incompetent." Subsection (e) clearly and unambiguously references that a violation only occurs
if a licensee is "negligent" or "incompetent," as defined in the uniform standards of professional
appraisal practices .... " I.C. § 54-4107(1)(e). Because US PAP does not define negligent or
incompetent, a violation of Idaho Code §54-4107(1)(e) cannot occur. Although the legislature
may desire to amend the statute because USPAP fails to define these terms, neither the Board nor
the Court are vested with the authority to legislate such an amendment to the statute.
Accordingly, the Hearing Officer, David Wynkoop's Findings of Fact, and the Board's Final
Order must be reversed as to finding that Petitioner, Timothy Williams violated Idaho Code §
54-4107(1)( e).

2 The Board suggests that this issue was raised for the first time on appeal. However, the lack of proof by
the Board as to any alleged violation of § 54-4107(1)(d) was raised both by Respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration, (R. Agency, Vol. II, Tab No. 89, p. 8); Respondent's Motion for Involuntary Dismissal,
(R. Agency, Vol. II, Tab No. 92, p. 2, , 3); Respondent's Motion for the Board of Real Estate Appraisers
to Not Approve, Adopt, or Ratify the Recommended Findings and Order of the Hearing Officer, (R.
Agency, Vol. II, Tab No. 93, p. 4, , 11). In addition, the lack of factual findings or evidence to support a
violation ofIdaho Code §54-4107(1)(d) were raised on appeal to the district court. (R., at p. 000006-15.)
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Finally, the Board's present reliance upon a violation of USPAP rules to support the
Board's finding of a violation of Idaho Code § 54-4107(1)(e) is unsupported by the record. 3 In
particular, regardless of the present stance taken by the Board, there was no finding by the
Hearing Officer or by the Board that any alleged violation of USP AP was sufficient to constitute
a finding of either "negligence" or "incompetence" as required by Idaho Code § 54-4107(1)(e).
In short, there was no legal or factual support for the Board's determination that Williams
violated Idaho Code § 54-4107(1)(e).4 Consequently, the Board acted in excess of its statutory
authority in decreeing that Williams violated Idaho Code § 54-4107(1)(e).
E.

Idaho Code § 54-4107(1)(c).
Idaho Code § 54-4107(1)(c) states:
54-4107. Disciplinary proceedings. (1) The board shall upon a written
sworn complaint or may upon its own motion investigate the actions of
any state licensed or certified real estate appraiser and may suspend or
revoke any license or certificate issued under this chapter for any of the
following:
(c) Making any substantial misrepresentation, false promises or false
or fraudulent representations;

Neither, the Hearing Office, David Wynkoop's Findings of Fact, nor the Board's Final
Order, state that the Petitioner Timothy Williams' appraisal certifications on the Tri-Circle and
Post Falls appraisal reports constituted a "substantial misrepresentation, false promise or false or

Pages 15-17 of Respondent's Brief seek to justify the Board's conclusion that Petitioner violated Idaho
Code 54-4107 (1 )( e), as well as (c), in relation to the personal investigation of certain properties, Count
Two. However, the Board never alleged a violation ofIdaho Code § 54-4107(1)(e) with respect to Count
Two, and neither the Hearing Officer, David Wynkoop nor the Board may decree such a violation
occurred when it was not pled or alleged.
4 Instead, the Board appears to advance a theory ofnegligence-per-se based upon a violation USPAP.
This argument lacks support in the evidentiary record and is unsupported by any legal authority relied
upon by the Board.
3
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fraudulent representation." In essence, there are no findings to support that, pursuant to Count
Two of the Board's Amended Complaint, a violation ofIdaho Code § 54-4107(l)(c) occurred.
Similarly, neither the Hearing Officer David Wynkoop's Findings of Fact, nor the
Board's Final Order, in relation to Count Eight of the Board's Amended Complaint relating to
the Donnelly appraisal set forth that a "substantial misrepresentation, false promise or false or
fraudulent representation" occurred. (See, R. Agency, Vol. II, at Tab No. 88.) The Board can
argue that the Donnelly appraisal was allegedly misleading, which is adamantly disputed by
Timothy Williams, but whether the appraisal is misleading is not the standard. There must be a
specific finding that the Petitioner, Timothy Williams, made a "substantial misrepresentation,
false promise or false or fraudulent representation." No such finding was made and the Board's
Final Order decreeing a violation of Idaho Code § 54-4107(1)(c) in relation to the Donnelly
appraisal should be reversed.
In addition, the Board never alleged a violation of Idaho Code §54-41 07(1)(c) in relation
to Count Eight, and neither the Hearing Officer, David Wynkoop nor the Board may decree such
a violation occurred when it was not pled or alleged.

IV.

PETITIONER'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED BY THE BOARD.

A.

The Board's arbitrary and capricious application of Idaho Code § 54-4107 and its
vague and ambiguous terms in order to revoke the license of Petitioner was
sufficiently raised and preserved for appeal.
The Board presently argues that Petitioner's argument challenging the constitutionality of

Idaho Code §54-4107 has been raised for the first time in this appeal. (See, Resp't Br., at p. 1016.)5 The Board does not and cannot argue that Petitioner does not have a substantial right to a

The Board's assertion regarding which issues were previously raised narrowly and inaccurately
construes the record in this case. Petitioner presented evidence and contested the factual and legal
evidence the Board relied upon to support its claimed violations ofIdaho Code 54-4107; filed a Motion
5
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reasonably fair decision making process, and m proper adjudication of the proceeding by
application of correct legal standards, in the context of these proceedings which involve,
ultimately, the revocation of Petitioner's license to practice his chosen profession. See State
Transp. Dept. v. Kalani-Keegan, 155 Idaho 297, 311 P.3d 309 (2013) (determining that, as a

matter of law, petitioner therein was entitled to challenge the deprivation of a substantial right,
regardless of whether it was raised in prior proceedings and regardless, that it was sufficiently
preserved for appeal).6
The Board likewise suggests that Petitioner was sufficiently on notice of the conduct
which the Board deemed sufficient to revoke Petitioner's license. In so doing, the Board defines
the terms "negligent," "incompetent," and "substantial misrepresentation," and declares that "in
the professional licensing context, a term is not unconstitutionally vague when it is evaluated
against the declared standards of a profession." (Resp 'f Br., p. 11.)

The Board fails to

for Reconsideration challenging the sufficiency of the evidence of any alleged violations of Idaho law and
the definitions of the terms utilized against him (R. Agency, Vol. II, at Tab No. 89); filed a Motion for
Involuntary Dismissal as to the claims which the Hearing Officer found a violation (R. Agency, Vol. II, at
Tab No. 92); filed a Motion for the Board of Real Estate Appraisers to not Approve, Adopt, or Ratify the
Recommended Findings and Order of the Hearing Officer, again raising both procedural and substantive
objections to the evidence and the definitions utilized to sanction Petitioner (R. Agency, Vol. II, at Tab No.
93) (see also R. Agency, Vol. II, at Tab No. 94).
6
These substantial rights existing as a matter of course or procedure are
established, demonstrated, and determined as a matter of law....
The lTD contends that the hearing officer should have sustained, not
vacated the suspension. This appeal involves both aspects of the
substantial rights noted in Hawkins, namely whether the decision-making
process was reasonably fair and whether the matter was properly
adjudicated through the application of correct legal standards. Looking
at prejudice from the standpoint of material effect, no more prejudicial
effect can be shown than an erroneous decision on the ultimate outcome
of a matter in which there can be but two opposing results. 10 Once
again, it is difficult to imagine what the lTD could present to the district
court in satisfaction of I.e. § 67-5279(4), other than what is apparent as
a matter of fact and law, which would demonstrate prejudicial effect of
an erroneous decision to vacate as opposed to sustain the suspension.
Kalan i-Keegan , 155 Idaho at _,311 P.3d at 315-316 (internal citations omitted).
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acknowledge that the parties' presented contrary expert testimony on the standard of care and
upon the actions which would violate those standards. (See e.g., R., Agency Tr., at p. 741, l. 12
p. 765, I. 24; p. 778, I. 19

p. 910, l. 7.) Moreover, as the Board acknowledges, the ordinary

meaning of "substantial misrepresentation" "is usually accompanied by an intent to deceive."
(Resp't Br., p. 13.) The Board also retroactively defines what is meant by "substantial

misrepresentation" for the purposes of Idaho Code § 54-41 07( 1)(c), but fails to identify how this
definition should be evaluated against the declared standards of the appraisal profession. 7 The
Board did not present evidence, and the Hearing Officer did not make any finding, that
Petitioner's action in entering the Wells Fargo RETECH system was accompanied by an "intent
to deceive," nor was there any evidence or finding that Petitioner's actions fell below the
declared standards of the appraisal profession.
Additionally, the Board's argument that the terms "negligent" and "incompetent" as used
in Idaho Code § 54-4107 are not unconstitutionally vague is unsupported by the plain language
of Idaho Code §54-4107, which specifically requires that those terms be applied "as defined in
the uniform standards of professional appraisal practices .... " I.C. § 54-4107(1)(e) (emphasis
added). As noted above, those terms are not defined in the uniform standards. It is unclear
whether the Board alleged or sanctioned Petitioner for conduct which it determined to be
"negligent" or "incompetent" as the Board appeared to utilize those terms interchangeably.

At

the hearing and continuing through their briefing upon appeal, the Board appears to take the
position that failure to adhere to a standard of USP AP is per se negligence and/or incompetence.
There is no evidence or law cited to support this theory and the Board acted in excess of its

In point of fact, the Hearing Officer specifically found that Mr. Williams' conduct with respect to the
Wells Fargo RETECH access claim, Count One, did not constitute a violation of US PAP. (R. Agency,
Vol. II, at Tab No. 88, p. 9.) Thus, it is unclear what professional standards the Board claims Petitioner's
conduct should have been measured against in this case.
7
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statutory and constitutional authority in arbitrarily defining and applying these terms ex post
facto to justify its course of conduct.
Similarly, the Board's argument that the Hearing Officer heard testimony regarding
Petitioner's conduct in comparison to the standards of US PAP misses the point - that Idaho
Code § 54-4107(1)(e) expressly requires a showing of "negligence" or "incompetence." (Resp't
Br., p. 14.) Even assuming that Petitioner's conduct were to be evaluated in the context of
professional standards, there is no showing and no evidence that a failure to adhere to any
particular USP AP standard of conduct is "negligence" or "incompetence" for the purposes of
Idaho Code § 54-4107(1)(e). Thus, the present claim that Petitioner was sufficiently on notice of
the conduct which the Board would later deem to constitute "negligence" and/or
"incompetence," is unsupported by the record and by the law. Moreover, the Hearing Officer did
not make a finding that Petitioner's conduct with respect to any particular USP AP standard
constituted "negligence" or "incompetence."
As recognized in H&V Engineering, Inc. v. Idaho State Board of Professional Engineers
and Land Surveyors, 113 Idaho 646, 747 P.2d 55 (1987), "[t]he court is obliged, however, to
reverse a decision if substantial rights of an individual have been prejudiced because the
administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are 'in violation of constitutional or
statutory provisions.' " Id. at 649, 747 P.2d at 58, (citing I.C. § 67-5215(g); Allen v. Lewis-Clark
State College, 105 Idaho 447, 452, 670 P.2d 854,859 (1983)). The case ofH&V Engineering is
particularly applicable where, as here, the "grounds for discipline have not been defined by
statute nor by the Board itse1f..." Id., at 650, 747 P.2d at 59. As with H&V Engineering,
nowhere does Idaho Code § 54-4107 nor USP AP define the grounds for discipline; for example,
no regulation defines failure to strictly adhere to a particular USPAP standard as "negligence" or
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"incompetence." See Jd., at 650, 747 P.2d at 59. 8

The Board's decision to revoke Petitioner's

license, absent articulating clear standards of discipline, exceeded the constitutional and statutory
authority granted to the Board and must be reversed. 9

V.

BIASED AND PUNITIVE CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD

The Chairman of the Board, Mr. Brad lanoush has a personal vendetta against Timothy
Williams. The bias of Mr. lanoush and its pervasive effect upon the Board was raised multiple
times before the Board and in these proceedings. The claim that Petitioner did not sufficiently
preserve the issue of lack of due process and its effect upon the outcome of this case is
unsupported. The Hearing Officer, David Wynkoop specifically found on p. 8 of the Findings of
Fact:
Clearly, Mr. lanoush was biased, Mr. lanoush went to great lengths to
inform others of the inappropriate RETECHS access by Mr. Williams.
Mr. lanoush believed that Mr. Williams' Idaho appraisal license should be
revoked. He even went so far as to advise Mr. Williams to leave town and
if he failed to do so, Mr. lanoush would see that Mr. Williams' license
was revoked. In addition, the March 21, 2011, Board minutes reflect that
three and a half years into this litigation, Chairman of the Board Brad
lanoush refused to recuse himself despite the recommendation of Board
counsel to do so.

(See, R., at p. 0000382, Second Affidavit of Kimbell Gourley, Exhibit B, and R.
Agency Tr., at p. 205. 1. 14-25; p. 206, I. 1-25; and p. 207, l. 1-14.)

The Officer gave passing recognition to Petitioner's argument and evidence that, absent damages, there
could be no proof of negligence. (See R. Agency, Vol. II, at Tab No. 88, p. 11.) The prejUdice inherent in
the lack of a defined standard is particularly evident where, as here, Petitioner was not sufficiently warned
as to the standards by which his conduct would be measured and how, in turn, any particular conduct
would subject him to discipline.
9 Reversal, rather than a remand is appropriate where, as here, the standards upon which the Board
disciplined Petitioner did not warn Petitioner of the prohibited conduct. See H&V Engineering, 113 Idaho
at 652, 747 P.2d at 61.
8
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Mr. lanoush also elected to attend the trial of this matter on the day subsequent to
completing his witness testimony. Brad Janoush was biased and punitive in relation to Timothy
Williams and poisoned the remaining Board members to the point that the remaining Board
members could no longer be unbiased and render a fair and impartial decision.

The Board

responds to this argument by asserting that Brad Janoush recused himself at the midnight hour at
the February 10, 2012 Board meeting. This last minute recusal was meaningless in the big
picture of this proceeding because Brad Janoush had already created the prejudice and bias, and
set the stage for the Board's Final Order, by participating in the discussions, debates and
proceedings since his appointment to the Board in December, 2008. In light of Mr. Janoush's
conduct and adamant bias, there is ample evidence to support the conclusion that the Board
members were not in a position to render a fair and impartial decision after being subjected to the
Chairman's adamant views that Timothy Williams violated Idaho law and should have his
license revoked as stated by Mr. Janoush back in 2004 and going forward. Accordingly, the
Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact and the Board's Final Order should be reversed.
VI. FINAL ORDER

The Board's Order was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of the Board's discretion.
This issue is further evidenced by the manner in which the Board handled the award of attorney
fees to itself in this matter, claiming victory upon far more claims that it actually succeeded
upon. (See R., Agency, Vol. II, at Tab No. 97.) Absent articulating clear standards by which the
Board intended to sanction Petitioner, the Board proceeded to hearing and thereafter revoked
Petitioner's license after having only prevailed upon a small fraction of the claims it alleged. For
the reasons previously stated and supported in Petitioner's opening brief, the Board's Final Order
should be reversed.
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CROSS APPEAL
VII.

ATTORNEY'S FEES

The Board has cross-appealed the decision of the district court, reversing the Board's
award of attorney fees to itself. For the reasons stated below, the district court properly analyzed
the issue and correctly applied the law.
A.

Background and Procedural History
Pursuant to the Board's Final Order, entered February 27, 2012, the Board ordered

Petitioner to pay the Board's costs and attorneys' fees:
Respondent shall pay to the Board the costs and attorney's fees incurred
by the Board in the investigation and prosecution of Respondent regard
the four violations of the Board's laws and rules as set forth above. The
State shall submit an Affidavit of Costs and Attorney's Fees incurred
in this matter within thirty (30) days from the date of this Order.
Respondent shall submit any objection to the costs and fees submitted by
the State, and request a hearing within fifteen (15) days from the receipt
of the State's Affidavit. Thereafter, the Board shall detennine the
amount of costs and fees awarded against Respondent, and in the event
Respondent fails to object to the costs and fees claimed by the State,
Respondent shall by the costs and fees as set forth in its affidavit.
Respondent shall pay the costs and fees as detennined by the Board, or as
set forth in this section, within one hundred eighty (180) days from the
date of this Order.

(See R. Agency, Vol. II, at Tab No. 96, p. 3 (emphasis added).) It is undisputed that the Board
failed to submit an Affidavit of Costs and Attorney's Fees within thirty (30) days from the date
of the Final Order. Instead, on April 3, 2012, the Board filed its (untimely) Affidavit of Costs
and Fees ("Board's Affidavit"), claiming total costs and fees of $34,131.17. (See R. Agency, Vol.

IL at Tab No. 97, p. 2.) The Board did not file a motion to extend the time to file the Affidavit
prior to the expiration of the thirty (30) day deadline established by the Board's own Order.
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On April 4, 2012, Williams timely filed his Objection to Award of Attorney Fees and
Costs ("Respondent's Objection"), and requested a hearing. (See R. Agency Cert., Second Supp.,

at Attachment A.) On April 10, 2012, William filed a Supplement to Objection to Award of
Attorney Fees and Costs, in which Williams objected to the Board's Affidavit and moved that no
attorney's fees be awarded because the Board's Affidavit was untimely. (See R. Agency Cert.,

Second Supp., at Attachment B.)
On April 10, 2012, the Board requested, and was granted, a schedule to permit the parties
to brief the issues of the award of attorneys' fees, pursuant to which the Board filed its Response
to Respondent's Objection to Attorney Fees and Costs on May 21,2012. (See R. Agency Cert.,

Second Supp., at Attachment C.)

In addition, the Board filed affidavits from Lori Peel and

Dennis Stevenson. (See R. Agency Cert., Second Supp., at Attachments D and E.)
On June 4, 2012, Petitioner filed his Reply in Support of Objection to Award of
Attorney's Fees and Costs, in which Petitioner noted the lack of a motion to extend time to file
the Board's Affidavit. Only after Petitioner raised this issue did the Board file its Motion to
Extend Time to File the Affidavit of Costs and Fees, which Motion was filed on June 6, 2012.
Petitioner filed his Objection to the Board's Motion to Extend Time to File the Affidavit of Costs
and Fees on June 8, 2012. (See R. Agency eert., Second Supp., at Attachment G.)
On June 18, 2012, the Board, at its regular meeting, took up the matter of the Board's
Affidavit of Costs and Fees and Respondent's Objection to Award of Attorney Fees and Costs.

(See R. Agency Cert., Second Supp., at Attachment H.) On August 2,2012, the Board entered its
Memorandum Decision and Order on Costs and Fees. Id.
On August 17, 2012, Williams filed his First Amended Notice of Appeal to include the
Board's Memorandum Decision and Order on Costs and Fees, entered on August 2, 2012. On
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July 1, 2013, the district court entered its order reversing the Board's decision to award itself
attorney fees upon the grounds that the Board's decision exceeded its statutory authority. For the
same reasons, this Court should uphold the district court's ruling and reverse the Board's award
of attorney fees.
B.

Applicable Procedural Statutes

Idaho Code §67-2609 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) The bureau of occupational licenses shall wherever the several laws
regulating professions, trades and occupations which are devolved upon
the bureau for administration so require pursuant to written agreement as
provided in section 67-2604, Idaho Code, exercise, in its name, or as
authorized agent, but subject to the provisions of this chapter, the
following powers:
(6) To formulate rules for adoption by the boards allowing the boards to
recover costs and fees incurred in the investigation and prosecution
of a licensee in accordance with the contested case provisions of
chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code, for a violation of laws or rules of
the boards.
(7) To formulate rules for adoption by the boards establishing a schedule
of civil fines which may be imposed upon a licensee prosecuted in
accordance with the contested case provisions of chapter 52, title 67,
Idaho Code, for a violation of laws or rules of the boards. Any civil
fine collected by a board for a violation of its laws or rules shall not
exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000), unless otherwise provided by
statute, and shall be deposited in the bureau of occupational licensing
account.
IDAPA 24.18.01.525 ("Board Rule 525") authorizes the Board to(l) impose a civil fine
not to exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000) for each violation ofIdaho Code § 54-4107; and (2)
order a licensed or certified real estate appraiser to pay the costs and fees incurred by the Board
in the investigation and prosecution of a licensee. IDAPA 24.18.01.525.02 (emphasis added).
IDAPA 04.11.01.741.02(a) provides:
02. Time for Filing for Costs and/or Fees Awarded in Final Order or Preliminary
Order. Unless otherwise provided by statute or rule of the agency: (4-7-11)
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a. Minimum time for filing. When a final order or a preliminary order of the
agency awards costs and/or fees to a party or to the agency itself, the agency must
allow no fewer than fourteen (14) days from the service date of the final order or
the preliminary order for the party to whom costs and/or fees were awarded or for
the agency to file necessary papers (e.g., a memorandum of costs, affidavits,
exhibits, etc.) quantifying and otherwise supporting costs or fees, or both, that will
be claimed or a motion to extend the time to file for costs and fees. (4-7-11)
IDAPA 04.11.01. 741.02(a) (emphasis added).
C.

The Board's decision to award attorney's fees lacks support in the law and was
unfounded, arbitrarv, capricious, and an abuse of discretion.

This Court may reverse an agency decision made in excess of the statutory authority of
the agency. I.C. § 67-5279(3). The Board's decision to award itself attorney fees is just such a
decision. "In order for attorney fees to be awarded pursuant to a statute, the statute must clearly
contemplate that particular remedy." Sanchez v. State Dept. of Correction, 143 Idaho 239, 243,
141 P.3d 1108, 1112 (2006) (citing Idaho Power Co. v. Idaho Pub. Util. Comm 'n, 102 Idaho
744, 751, 639 P.2d 442,449 (1981) ("[I]t is clear that the Idaho legislature has provided for the
award of attorney fees specifically when it so intends, and only when it so intends.")).
Here, Petitioner does not challenge the authority of the Board to investigate and prosecute
violations of the Act and to recover costs and fees incurred in the investigation and prosecution
of a licensee. See I.e. § 67-2609; IDAPA 24.18.01.525.

However, the Board's reliance upon

this same authority to support an award of attorneys' fees is misplaced. The language ofldaho
Code § 67-2609, and IDAPA 24.18.01.525, is clear and unambiguous: it expressly authorizes a
fine, costs, and fees, only. IDAPA 24.18.01.525 ("The Board may order a licensed or certified
real estate appraiser to pay the costs and fees incurred by the Board in the investigation or
prosecution of the licensee for violation of Section 54-4107(1), Idaho Code.") There is no
provision for an award of attorneys' fees. Cf Sanchez, 143 Idaho at 243, 141 P.3d at 1112 ("the
statute must clearly contemplate that particular remedy.")
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Consequently, although the Board

relies upon its authority to formulate rules "for adoption by the board" to recover costs and fees,
the fact of the matter is that the Board, even if it had the authority, did not formulate a rule for
the recovery of attorneys' fees.
To further illustrate the fallacy of the Board's position on this matter, there is a
distinction between the Board awarding itself fees, such as witness fees, which are specifically
contemplated by Idaho Code § 54-4107(2), and the Board awarding itself attorneys' fees. Cf
Sanchez, 143 Idaho at 243, 141 P.3d at 1112. This distinction is particularly evident upon a

review of statutes authorizing the award of attorneys' fees in similar circumstances.

For

instance, Idaho Code § 54-1806A authorizes the State Board of Medicine to assess "costs and
attorney's fees against the respondent physician for any investigation and/or administrative

proceeding."(emphasis added); Idaho Code § 54-2059 authorizes the Idaho real estate
commission to "temporarily suspend or permanently revoke licenses issued under the provisions
of this chapter, issue a formal reprimand and impose a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed
five thousand dollars ($5,000), and assess costs and attorneys' fees for the cost of any
investigation and administrative or other proceedings against any licensee who is found to have
violated any section of the Idaho Code, the commission's administrative rules or any order of the
commission." (emphasis added).

That Board now seeks to interpret its own rules to include

attorneys' fees, despite the lack of a specific provision to this effect, is beyond the statutory
authority granted to the Board.
Similarly, the Board's reliance upon Ada County Highway Dist. By & Through
Fairbanks v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873, 673 P.2d 1067 (1983), to support an award of attorneys'

fees in the present matter, is inapposite. (See R. Agency Cert., Second Supp., at Attachment C,
pp. 2-3.) Acarrequi was a condemnation case, not an administrative proceeding, and it was tried
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to the district court. Therein, the district court awarded the prevailing party its attorney's fees
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code 12-121. 10 Idaho Code § 12-121
does not, however, provide authority for an award of fees in an administrative action such as the
present matter. See Sanchez, 143 Idaho at 243, 141 P.3d at 1112. As noted by the Court in
Sanchez:

Idaho Code section 12-121 authorizes a court to award the prevai ling party fees
"in any civil action" where the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously.
Minich v. Gem State Dev., Inc., 99 Idaho 911, 918, 591 P.2d 1078, 1085 (1979).
This Court has clarified that Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 3(a) "clearly declares
that 'a civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.' " Lowery
v. Board of County Com 'rs for Ada County, 117 Idaho 1079, 1081, 793 P.2d 1251,
1253 (1990).
!d. Based upon the foregoing, the Board's reliance upon Acarrequi, a civil action, to establish

precedent for the theory that the Board has the authority to award attorneys' fees,
notwithstanding the absence of an authorizing statute or rule, is meritless.
The Board exceeded its authority in ordering Williams to pay attorneys' fees incurred by
the Board.

The language of Idaho Code §67-2609, and IDAPA 24.18.01.525 is clear and

unambiguous: it expressly authorizes a fine, costs, and fees, only. There is no provision for an
award of attorneys' fees.

Consequently, Williams requests that the Court uphold the district

court's reversal of the Board's decision to award itself any attorneys' fees.

10 In Acarrequi, the Court specifically noted "[w]e deem it necessary to adopt a new standard governing an
award of both attorneys' fees and costs, only as it relates to a condemnation proceeding." (emphasis added).
105 Idaho at 875, 673 P.2d at 1069. In Acarrequi, the Court also said that in deciding whether to award
attorney fees, the trial court "should" consider the following factors:
(I) "a condemnor should have reasonably made a timely offer of settlement of at least 90 per cent
of the ultimate jury verdict;"
(2) "an offer would not be timely if made on the courthouse steps an hour prior to trial;" and
(3) "[a]n offer should be made within a reasonable period after the institution of the action to
relieve the condemnee not only of the expense but of the time, inconvenience and apprehension
involved in such litigation, and also to eliminate the cloud which may hang over the condemnees
title to the property."
State ex ref. Smith v. Jardine, 130 Idaho 318, 320, 940 P.2d 1137, 1139 (1997) (quoting Acarrequi, I 05 Idaho at 878,
673 P.2d at 1072).
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D.

The Board's finding that the costs and fees ordered bv the Board are not excessive
or unreasonable was unfounded, arbitrarY, capricious, and an abuse of discretion.
By its' Memorandum Decision and Order, the Board awarded itself the entirety of its

requested attorneys' fees. As noted above, this decision exceeded the statutory authority of the
Board and should therefore be reversed.

Moreover, in awarding itself the entirety of the

requested amount of attorneys' fees and costs, the Board's decision was not supported by
substantial evidence or the record as a whole. In addition, and recognizing the enormity of the
hurdle to prevail on a claim that the Board abused its discretion, Petitioner submits that this case
presents just that factual scenario: In particular, that the Board, in awarding itself its own claimed
attorneys' fees and costs, grossly mischaracterized the number of claims that it actually prevailed
upon to apportion the claimed attorneys' fees and costs and further neglected to address the
unreasonableness of the amount of time expended by the Board when contrasted with that of
Petitioner's counsel. (See R. Agency Cert., Second Supp., at Attachment H, p. 10.) Moreover, if,
as is evident in the record, the Board expended an excessive amount of time on this matter, the
Board should not be permitted to use the apportionment which it, by law, is required to do, as a
means to suggest that the Board has satisfied its obligation to review the reasonableness of the
Boards' request for attorneys' fees, fees, and costs as a whole.
In support of its decision to award itself the entirety of its own claimed attorneys' fees,
the Board relies primarily upon the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Haw v. idaho State Board
of Medicine, 143 Idaho 51, 137 P.3d 438 (2006).

However, Haw dictates that the Board's

decision to award itself the entirety of its claimed attorneys' fees is not supported by the record
and is an abuse of discretion. First, the attorney fee award in Haw was made pursuant to Idaho
Code §54-1806A(9), which specifically provides the board of medicine with the authority to
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"assess[] costs and attorney's fees." II As noted above, there is no such authorizing statute
authorizing the Board's award of attorneys' fees in the instant matter.
Second, the Board's reliance upon Haw to support its decision is flawed. The Court in
Heat' cautioned that while the board prevailed on a fairly small part of the allegations made, the

board did not prevail on the majority of its claims, and therefore, that an award of the entirety of
the fees incurred was not appropriate. Haw, 143 Idaho at 54-55,137 P.3d at 441-442.
The guiding principle is that the sanction must be related to the
discipline; I.C. § 54-1806A(9) does not authorize an open-ended sanction
simply because some form of discipline has been imposed. The Board
must engage in a meaningful analysis of the charges made in relation to
the charges upon which the Board was successful. While the Board need
not add up the allegations and calculate with mathematical precision who
won the most claims, there should be some analysis of precisely how
much time and effort went into proving the misconduct that resulted in
discipline. Here, the Board used what the hearing officer described as a
"shotgun approach" in making its allegations against Haw, who therefore
felt it necessary to present a full defense to every allegation. While the
Board is entitled to list as many violations as it thinks appropriate and
supported by its investigation, it must be mindful the doctor will, as a
result, be forced to defend against everyone of the claims charged.
Id. at 54-55, 137 P.3d at 441-442. Consequently, the Haw Court directed the board to "consider

how many of the claims the doctor prevailed on, the overall success in supporting the Board's
allegations and the amount of time and effort devoted to proving the claimed misconduct for
which discipline was imposed, as opposed to the total time spent in pursuing all of the
allegations." !d. at 55, 137 P.3d at 442 (emphasis added.)
Though the Board sought and received a restriction on Haw's use of
injectable hormones, it also sought discipline based on allegations of
Haw's poor handwriting, his use of lab testing, his stereotypical and
incomplete charting and record keeping, and his dealings with
consultants. In light of the multiple allegations made, the Board cannot
11 As noted by the Court in Haw, the Court must first determine whether an award of attorney fees is authorized by
the enabling statute. Based upon the language of I.e. § 54-1806A(9), the Court concluded that "this statute clearly
gives the Board authority to assess attorney fees as a sanction if grounds for discipline are found to exist after the
merits of all proceedings have been considered." 143 Idaho at 53, 137 P.3d at 440.

PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF ON APPEAL - 21

claim it was fully successful in what it was seeking to achieve and,
therefore, is entitled to all its fees and costs. In actuality, the Board was
successful on a fairly small part of the allegations made and the Board
should have taken that into account in assessing any sanction relating to
fees and costs.

lei.
Here, based upon the formula utilized by the Board, it is undisputed that the Board
awarded to itself attorneys' fees, fees such as witness fees, and costs incurred to prosecute
conduct the hearing officer found to be unsanctionable. Cj' Haw, 143 Idaho at 55, 137 P.3d at
442.

Apart from asserting that that Board "engaged in a detailed and meaningful

apportionment," the record actually suggests that the Board gave no recognition to the fact that it
prevailed on only a small fraction of the claims alleged. (See R. Agency Cert., Second Supp., at
Attachment H, p. 9.) In particular, the Board gives itself credit for prevailing on Counts 1, 2, and
8, or 113 of the "counts" alleged. See Id. However, this calculation is a gross misrepresentation
of the actual claims that the Board actually pursued against Williams. In the present matter, the
Board, much like the Board in Haw, engaged in a shotgun approach in making its allegations
against Williams, and subsequently failed to account for the fact that it did not prevail upon a
significant majority of these claims. Rather, the Board suggests that because the violations that
were found were "serious," that the claimed fees were reasonable. This logic and analysis lacks
support in the evidentiary record and in the law.
Pursuant to the Board's original complaint and amended complaint, the Board asserted 41
separate claims of violations against Williams which were encompassed within nine counts (i.e.
Count One - 1 claim; Count Two, 12 claims; Count Three - 4 claims; Count Four - 18 claims;
Count Five - 1 claim; Count Six

1 claim; Count Seven

2 claims; Count Eight

1 claim;

Count Nine - 1 claim). (See R. Agency, Vol. I, at Tab No.1.) Williams prevailed on 37 of the
claims and the Board prevailed on 4 of the claims. (See R. Agency, Vol. I, at Tab No. 88; R.
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Agency, Vol. II, at Tab No. 96.) Thus, Williams prevailed on 90.24% of the claims alleged by the

Board. Yet, the Affidavit of Katherine Takasugi goes through a complicated allocation process,
but ultimately requests 44.63423% of the total fees charged to the Board be paid by the
Williams. (See R. Agenq, Vol. II., at Tab No. 97.)

In addition, the Board relies upon the

existence of Count 9, a claim that was dismissed, to conclude that it prevailed on 1/3 of the
claims asserted. (See R. Agency, Vol. II. , at Tab No. 97, Exhibit A - Affidavit of Katherine
Takasugi, pg. 2,

~

4) ("For any work that applied generally to all counts the fees have been

allocated "1/3", since the State prevailed in three out of nine counts.").
In addition, as regards Count Eight of the Board's Amended Complaint, Williams
prevailed on three out of four of these allegations, and the Board's Final Order only references
an alleged failure to properly disclose the availability of sewer to the property. (See R. Agency,

Vol. II. , at Tab No. 96.) Ms. Takasugi's affidavit charges 100% of all time spent on exclusively
Count Eight and the other formulas used by Ms. Takasugi assume that the Board was fully
successful in Count Eight. (See R. Agency, Vol. II, at Tab No. 97.) To the contrary, the Board
was only successful on one out of four of its allegations. Thus, inclusion of 100% of fees
charged relating exclusively to Count Eight, or incorporation of fees relating to Count Eight and
other counts and claims for which the Board was unsuccessful, is an abuse of discretion.
Thus, even though the Board only prevailed on less than 10% of its claims, it is asking
for 412 times that equivalent amount for attorneys' fees, based purely upon a subjective
determination as to what claim each time entry related. Using a formula approach, as advocated
by the Affidavit of Katherine Takasugi, the calculation of attorneys' fees to be awarded to the
Board would be 9.7561 % times $48,528.99, for a total of $4,734.54.
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The Board's decision to

award itself the entirety of the fees and costs requested (by the Board) was arbitrary, capricious,
and an abuse of discretion.
E.

The Board's counsels' hours are excessive and unreasonable.
The Board further abused its discretion in determining that the amount of claimed

attorneys' fees was reasonable because the amount of attorney time charged by the Board was
excessive.

In particular, the Board's counsel charged 860.44 total hours in relation to this

matter. (See R. Agency, Vol. lI., at Tab No. 97.) The Respondent Tim Williams counsel charged
271.90 hours to this matter. (See R. Agency, Vol. lI., at Tab No. 99.) Thus, the Respondent Tim
Williams' counsel only billed 31.60% of the hours billed by the Board's counsel.

The Board

concluded that because of the proration the Board performed, that any analysis of the
reasonableness of the cost and fee request was unreasonable. This conclusion lacks support in the
law and in the facts. (See R. Agency Cert., Second Supp., at Attachment H) In particular, the
Board's decision to ignore the excessive amount of time charged to Petitioner, prior to any
proration applied thereto, fails to take into account the reasonableness of the request.
In large part, it appears that the excessive amount of time expended by the Board's
counsel was caused by the Board's own conduct. The Board's initial counsel in this matter were
Michael Gilmore and Melissa Moody. (See R. Agency, Vol. lI., at Tab No. 97.) Then in 2011,
Mr. Gilmore and Ms. Moody were no longer affiliated with the matter and Katherine Takasugi
and Rob Adelson were assigned to the matter. Mr. Gilmore and Ms. Moody spent years on this
matter and had an extensive knowledge about the claims, defenses, and issues. This knowledge
base was lost when Mr. Gilmore and Ms. Moody were removed from the matter, and many,
many hours were necessarily incurred by Ms. Takasugi and Mr. Adelson to acquire this
equivalent knowledge base. Petitioner had nothing to do with this reassignment of counsel and
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should not be penalized or detrimentally affected in any way by this Board decision.

In

awarding itself attorneys' fees, the Board deemed the total requested fees, including duplicate
time to be "reasonable and appropriate." (See R. Agency Cert .. Second Supp., at Attachment H, p.
11.) This finding is unsupported by the record as a whole: that the Board expended more than
three times the amount of time of Petitioner's counsel; that the Board awarded itself attorney fees
for work that was duplicative of work previously performed by the Board's counsel; and, that the
Board failed to account for any reduction in the amount of attorneys' fees charged to Petitioner
for claims which the Board did not actually prevail upon.

The Board abused its discretion in

failing to take into account the foregoing in its award of attorney fees to itself.
F.

The Board's consideration of the Board's (admittedly untimely) Affidavit of Costs
and Fees was unfounded, arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion.
The Board abused its discretion in granting the Board's Motion to Extend Time to File

Affidavit of Costs and Attorney Fees. In particular, the Board, in its Final Order entered on
February 27, 2012, stated on page 3, that any request for attorneys' fees and costs by the Board
shall be made within thirty (30) days of the date of the Board's Final Order. (See R. Agency, Vol.

II, at Tab No. 96.) Thus, this time period expired on March 28, 2012. On April 3, 2012, Marci
Rightnowar filed an Affidavit of Costs and Fees. (See R. Agency, Vol. II, at Tab No. 97.) This
affidavit was undisputedly untimely. Accordingly, and pursuant to its own deadline, the Board
waived its right to claim attorney fees and costs. The Board's decision to excuse this failure,
absent a showing of "good cause," was an abuse of discretion.
IDAPA 04.11.01.741.02(a) requires that the Board either timely file its "necessary
papers", which the Board failed to do, or file a motion to extend the time to file for costs and
fees. On April 4, 2012, Petitioner filed his Objection to Award of Attorney Fees and Costs. (See

R. Agency Cert., Second Supp., at Attachment A.) On April 10, 2012, Petitioner filed his
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Supplement to Objection to Award of Attorney Fees and Costs, wherein Petitioner requested that
the claimed fees and costs be disallowed because the Affidavit of Fees and Costs was untimely
pursuant to the Board's own Final Order. (See R. Agency Cert., Second Supp., at Attachment B.)
Prior or contemporaneous to filing its Affidavit of Fees and Costs, the Board failed to file a
motion to extend time to file the Affidavit.

Rather, on May 21, 2012, the Board filed its

Response to Respondent's Objection to Attorney Fees and Costs wherein the Board asserted that
the request for fees and costs could still be considered [by the Board] pursuant to IDAPA
04.11.01.741.02(d) which provides that "[t]he agency may exercise its discretion to consider and
grant an untimely filing for costs and/or fees for good cause shown."

As of May 21,2012, the

Board had still not filed a motion to enlarge time, despite its reliance upon IDAPA
04.1 1.01. 741.02(a) and (d). It was not until after Petitioner raised the lack of a pending motion
to enlarge that the Board conveniently elected to file its motion to enlarge, which it subsequently
granted pursuant to its Memorandum Decision and Order on Costs and Fees. (See R. Agency

Cert., Second Supp., at Attachments G and H.) In so doing, the Board's determination that
"based upon a review of the totality of the circumstances, there is good cause for the untimely
filing of the State's Affidavit of Costs and Fees," is (1) not supported by substantial evidence on
the record as a whole; and (2) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. (See Id. at
Attachment H, pg. 12.)
By its Response to Respondent's Objection to Attorney Fees and Costs, the Board
acknowledges that the Order is clear and unambiguous, that it reviewed the Order, and that
Katherine Takasugi provided her affidavit to the Bureau 5-days prior to the deadline set forth in
the Board's own Order. (See R. Agency Cert., Second Supp., at Attachrnent C, pp. 8-14.) Instead,
the Board asserted, and subsequently adopted pursuant to its decision, the claim that Ms. Peel, a
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paralegal working with the team of attorneys working for the Board, failed to note the 30-day
time limit: "[b]ecause of the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in HaH' v. Board o/Medicine, 143
Idaho 51 (2006), I focused on ensuring that the costs were apportioned and did not notice that the
Final Order gave the 30-day time period within which to file the affidavit of costs and attorney
fees rather than the 45-day time period provided in current final orders. " (See R. Agency Cert.,
Second Supp., at Attachment D, Affidavit

ol Lori Peel is Support 0/ State's Response to

Respondent's Objection to Attorney Fees and Costs,

~

7.) However, no "current final orders"

were provided to support this assertion. In addition, upon review of the invoices attached to the
Affidavit of Costs and Fees, each of the "costs" claimed were known to the Bureau months, if
not years, before the deadline set by the Board. (See R. Agency, Vol. II. , at Tab No. 97,

Exhibits.) 12

There exists no "good cause" for the assertion that the Bureau could not have

timely filed the Affidavit of Fees and Costs pursuant to the Board's Order. Moreover, there can
be no argument that, out of the team of attorneys assigned to work on this case who spent more
than 860 hours to prosecute this case, that Ms. Peel's calendaring mistake, which appears to be
personal to Ms. Peel since Ms. Takasugi timely provided her Affidavit to the Board, excuses the
Board's failure to comply with its own scheduling deadline. In this regard, it is particularly
noteworthy that the 30-day deadline set by the Board, and then missed by the Board, was far in
excess of the default 14-day deadline set forth in IDAPA 04.11.01.741.02(a).
Moreover, there is no assertion that the 30-day deadline, set by the Board itself, was
anything other than conspicuous. In fact, that Ms. Takasugi complied with the deadline and

12 In particular, Exhibit B, Invoices from Uranga and Uranga were marked received by the Bureau no later than
October 26,2010; Exhibit C containing invoices from Sherer and Wynkoop, LLP were marked received by the
Bureau no later than January 4,2012; Exhibit D, Invoices for Denise Graham for court reporting services and
transcripts were received by the Bureau in or around December, 8, 2011; Exhibits E and F relate to Invoices from
Integrity Appraisal, the majority of which were marked received by the Bureau in 2007 and the most recent marked
received by August 29, 20 II; Exhibit G is an Affidavit of Witness Expenses signed September 9, 20 II; Exhibit H
appears to be an undated invoice for Investigator services provided by Cindy Stephenson between 2006 and 2007.
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submitted her Affidavit is evidence of the fact that at least one of the attorneys for the Board
reco.brnized the deadline. (See R. Agency Cert.. Second c)'Upp .. at Attachment C) Upon receipt of
Ms. Takasugi's Affidavit, it would seem reasonable that at least one other attorney for the
Bureau or Ms. Peel would have taken immediate action to ensure that the same was timely filed
with the Board. That the Bureau then failed to take any action with respect to the motion,
notwithstanding the notice provided in the Order and the receipt of the Takasugi affidavit, until
April 3, does not merit a finding of "good cause" or "excusable neglect" as contemplated by
IDAPA 04.11.01.741.02(d).
The Idaho Supreme Court in In re SRBA, 149 Idaho 532, 237 P.3d 1, (2010), expressly
rejected a similar argument:
The Bedkes urge that the confusion they suffered due to the combined
recommendation and order, coupled with the February 28 calendar entry,
excuses their untimely filing of their notice of challenge and that pursuant
to I.R.C.P. 55(c) the court should have heard their challenge. . ..
Consistent with the express terms of I.R.C.P. 6(b), this Court reviews a
trial court's decision whether to grant a motion for enlargement for abuse
of discretion. Wheeler v. McIntyre, 100 Idaho 286, 289, 596 P.2d 798,801
(1979).
We are unable to conclude that the district court abused its discretion by
denying the Bedkes' motion to deem their challenge as timely filed. The
district court noted that the special master's order denying the Bedkes'
motion to alter or amend and recommending attorney fees "clearly and
unequivocally separates the order on the motion to alter or amend from
the special master's recommendation on costs and fees." The district court
continued, stating:
... Had Bedkes checked the docket sheet or the register of actions for the
case they would have seen entries for both the order denying the motion
to alter or amend and the special master's recommendation with objection
deadline.
More importantly, the district court noted that the Bedkes need not have
consulted the register of actions or the court's docket sheet, since they
were parties to the subcase and had actual notice of the special master's
actions, which were clearly delineated. The district court concluded that
"the Bedkes are not new to the SRBA process and have previously filed a
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challenge to the Presiding Judge. The Court does not find the Bedkes'
alleged confusion to be reasonable under the circumstances.
Jd. at 538-539, 237 P.3d at 7-8.

The Board, in its decision to grant its own untimely Motion to Enlarge Time, in order to
consider its untimely Affidavit of Costs and Fees, failed to take into account any of the factual
and legal arguments raised by Petitioner. Instead, the Board determined that "it is simply not
reasonable for a mistake made in good faith to deprive this Board of its authority to impose
discipline it feels reasonable and just in the circumstances, not only on the basis of carrying out
its disciplinary authority, but also for the benefit of the licensees who support the Board's
operations." (See R. Agency Cert., Second Supp., at Attachment H, pg. 12.) That the Board now
seeks to justify its conduct "for the benefit of the [other] licensees" is irrelevant to the
determination of whether "good cause" exists for the act of the belated filing of the Affidavit of
Costs and Fees, and is a patent abuse of discretion.
Finally, the assertion that Petitioner is not prejudiced by the Board's consideration of its
untimely request for attorney fees and costs is untenable:
afforded to Petitioner in this matter is evident:

Instead, the lack of due process

The Board's Final Order was clear and

unambiguous and required the Board to file its Affidavit of Costs and Fees within 30 days, at
which time Petitioner was to be afforded an opportunity to object and request a hearing.
Consistent with the Board's Order, Petitioner did just that by his Objection, wherein he requested
a hearing. (See, R. Agency Cert., Second Supp., at Attachment A.) Instead of setting the matter
for hearing, as set forth as the required procedure in the Final Order, the Board requested, and
not surprisingly the Board granted to itself, an opportunity to brief the issue and to submit
additional evidence to support its failure to timely file its Affidavit.

Having given itself an

opportunity to attempt to cure its own mistake, the Board ultimately entered its Memorandum
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Decision and order on Costs and Fees on August 2.2012. wherein the Board adopted, in full, its
own arguments made with respect to the reasonahleness of the fees and costs requested. as well
as the "good cause" for its failure to comply with a deadline of its own making. To suggest that
Petitioner was provided with a meaningful opportunity to respond to the Board's arguments is
tenuous, at best. As illustrated herein, the Board's decision to extend its deadline in order that
other licensees not be punished for the Board's [in]actions is not supported by substantial
evidence in the record as a whole, and is arbitrary. capricious, and an abuse of discretion.
G.

The Board's consideration of the Affidavit of Lori Peel and Affidavit of Dennis
Stevenson, filed May 21, 2012, was unfounded, arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse
of discretion.

The Board's consideration of the Affidavit of Lori Peel and Affidavit of Dennis
Stevenson, filed May 21, 2012, was unfounded, arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion
because the Board failed to identify a factual or legal basis for the consideration of the same at
this point in the proceedings. The Board's Final Order permitted the Board to file an Affidavit of
Costs and Fees within 30-days.

The Affidavit of Lori Peel and the Affidavit of Dennis

Stevenson were both filed beyond the 30-days permitted pursuant to the Board's Order.

VIII. THE BOARD IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL.
By its Respondent's Brief, Respondents have requested an award of attorney's fees on
appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117. Idaho Code § 12-11 i

3

does not support an award of

attorney's fees to the Board in the present matter. Idaho Code § 12-117(1) provides:
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative
proceeding or civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a
13 Prior to its amendment in March, 2012, Idaho Code § 12-117( 1) did not allow a court to award attorney
fees on judicial review of an administrative decision. See St. Luke's Magic Valley Regional Medical
Center, Ltd. v. Board of County Commissioners of Gooding County, 150 Idaho 484, 490,248 P.3d 735,
741 (2011); Smith v. Washington Cnty., 150 Idaho 388, 391, 247 P.3d 615, 618 (2010)).
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state agency or a political subdivision and a person, the state agency, or
political subdivision or the court hearing the proceeding, as the case may
be including on appeal, shall award the prevailing party reasonable
attorney's fees, witness fees and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that
the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in faet or law.
Here, by its present request, the Board has failed to advance any legal or factual support
for an assertion that Petitioner has "acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." Rather, as
noted herein, and as supported by the record, Petitioner has contested the Board's Final Order
based upon undisputed substantive and procedural irregularities that require reversal of the
Board's Final Order. In particular, the Board's undisputed failure to comply with the statutory
directive ofIdaho Code § 54-4107, the Board's unsupported finding ofa violation ofIdaho Code
§ 54-4107(1)(d) and (e), as well as (c); and, the procedural irregularities resulting from Mr.
lanoush's involvement in this matter which deprived Petitioner of the right to have this matter
decided by a fair and impartial Board. For these same reasons, however, Petitioner is entitled to
an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117 on this appeal.

IX.

CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT

For the reasons stated above, Williams respectfully requests that the Court:
1.

Reverse the Board's February 27, 2012, Final Order, hold that the lanoush

Investigation and Orman Investigation were initiated in violation of Idaho Code § 54-4107
and/or the adopted procedures and policies of IBOL and the Board, and dismiss with prejudice
all claims against Williams;
2.

Dismiss Counts One through Eight in the March 7, 2011, Amended Complaint

based upon the Board not having met its burden of proof, and there being no "substantial
misrepresentation";
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3.

Reverse the Board's Final Order based upon Board misconduct and bias, and a

denial of Williams' due process rights to a fair and impartial trial;
4.

Dismiss Counts One through Eight in the March 7, 2011, Amended Complaint

based upon the Board's Final Order being (i) arbitrary, (ii) capricious, and (iii) an abuse of
discretion;

5.

Reverse the Board's revocation of Williams' license and imposition of a fine

based upon the Board's Final Order being (i) arbitrary, (ii) capricious, and (iii) an abuse of
discretion;
6.

For an award of Williams' attorney fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-

117; and
7.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable.

DATED this 3

O~ of January, 2014.
JONES. GLEDHlLL. FUHRMAN. GOURLEY,

P.A.

By:
Kimbell D. Gourley, Oft] Firm
Attorneys for Petitionty imothy Williams
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